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AID AND SAVINGS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:  




This paper examines the effect of aid on domestic savings in Sub-Saharan Africa. It departs 
from the previous literature on aid and savings in developing countries by abandoning the 
pervasive, but untenable, assumption that all aid is used to expand the trade deficit and thus 
applied wholly to consumption or investment. In fact, for the period 1965-2006, the evidence 
suggests that 35% of any increase in aid relative to output was used to finance reverse flows 
(some combination of interest payments, debt amortization, capital flight and reserve 
increases), 41% was used to increase consumption relative to output (meaning a reduction in 
the domestic savings rates) and 24% was used to increase the rate of investment. However, 
during the extended period of increasing aid levels from the early 1970s to mid 1990s, reverse 
flows were a larger proportion of aid but more aid was invested and less was consumed. Also, 
concerns about potential aid hangovers, when current high aid levels subside, can be 
assuaged by the evidence that that effect has been historically uncommon in the region 
despite many episodes of high aid levels followed by sharp declines. 
1  INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1980s, Sub-Saharan Africa has been the recipient of the highest amounts of aid 
(as a proportion of GDP) among the world’s developing regions (Table A1).1 With the current 
and anticipated continued scale-up of aid in support of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) and debt relief, this region can expect to receive continued high levels of international 
financial support in the years to 2015 (or thereabouts).2 However, there is no presumption that 
this level of external resource availability will continue indefinitely. At some point, likely just 
before 2015 (or not far beyond), aid receipts will fall and may do so precipitously. Moreover, 
any prospect of a sustained (moderate to high) rate of economic growth would require the 
mobilization of additional domestic resources to fund wider development programs (beyond 
the immediate concerns of the Millennium Development Goals). It is therefore important that 
these countries continue to develop their capacity for domestic resource mobilization despite 
the relative abundance of external resources. 
However, Africa’s record, with respect to domestic resource mobilization, is not an 
impressive one. Since the mid-1980s, Sub-Saharan Africa has had the lowest investment rate  
of any region (by a significant margin) and, since the early 1990s, the lowest domestic savings 
rate as well (Serieux, 2008). This has been so despite widespread financial liberalization, in the 
mid 1980s to early 1990s, that was meant to boost savings and investment rates. Thus, while 
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the high levels of development assistance may be necessary to support programs that address 
some of the regions chronic human development challenges (such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic), 
there is legitimate concern that it may worsen already low savings propensities and contribute 
less to domestic economic activity than the numbers might at first suggest. In the first 
instance, the abundance of foreign resources may be encouraging higher consumption rates 
and (by implication) reduced domestic savings rates. Secondly, if these higher consumption 
patterns become institutionalized, it could lead to protracted delays in the recovery of 
domestic savings after aid levels had declined - an aid hangover. Thirdly, aid that does not 
contribute to consumption may not, in fact, contribute to investment but, instead, be diverted 
to reverse flows in the form of debt amortization, capital flight and reserve accumulation. 
This paper seeks to appraise the validity of these concerns. More to the point, the 
relationship between aid and savings, in the African context, is examined and, related to this, 
the relative importance of reverse flows. Further, an attempt is made to determine whether the 
relationship between aid and savings has been significantly different during the period when 
aid levels were rising (1974-94), and whether there has been any discernible delay in the 
adjustment of savings during periods when aid levels (relative to income) were being scaled 
down from very high levels. 
In that regard, the motivation, context and results of this research are presented as 
follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical and empirical background to this research and a 
reconsideration of one of the central interpretations of the aid coefficient in the savings 
equation. Section 3 outlines the methodology to be used to derive relevant results. Section 4 
presents those results and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2  THE RECORD OF AID AND SAVINGS IN AFRICA:  
A LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1  AID AND SAVINGS – THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Historically, the interest of economists in the relationship between aid and savings has derived 
largely from what that relationship can tell us about the robustness of domestic resource 
mobilization efforts on the one hand and the consumption-investment choice relating to 
cheap external finance on the other. Since aid is always an inflow of external resources, it 
provides the receiving authority (usually the government) with increased command over 
either foreign or domestic resources.3 The perception has been, that this prerogative could 
either be used (by domestic authorities) to supplement domestic savings in order to achieve a 
higher investment rate (or transferred to others to do so), or it can be used to increase 
consumption. Thus, the theoretical arguments in favour or against aid has rested, in a large 
part, on the presumed choice between investment and consumption – a choice that is seen to 
be ultimately reflected in the effect of aid on domestic savings. Largely ignored, except for 
references in the early heterodox literature, has been the possibility that aid can also be used 
to fund reverse (or outward) flows – making it available for neither consumption nor 
investment. This has been largely due to a very strong assumptions made early on in both the 
theoretical and empirical literature – that of the strict use of aid to expand the trade balance - 
which have been carried through subsequent work, largely as a matter of course, despite the 
fact that that assumption does not, and likely never did, stand up to close examination. Working Paper  3 
 
 
The first formal model specifically aimed at explaining the potentially critical role that 
development assistance could play in allowing countries to achieve desired investment levels 
and thus, ultimately, targeted growth levels, was the two-gap model (Chenery and Strout, 
1966). That model argued, in essence, that, in attempting to achieve the high investment levels 
necessary for generating and sustaining moderate to high growth rates, developing countries 
were likely to face one of two binding constraints: either an inability to generate sufficient 
foreign exchange to purchase the needed capital and intermediate goods to achieve the 
desired rate or quality of investment (a foreign exchange constraint), or an inability to generate 
sufficient domestic savings to achieve the desired rate of investment (a savings constraint). 
Foreign resource inflows, such as aid, could remove either constraint by providing needed 
foreign exchange and/or filling the gap between domestic savings and required investment 
levels. In the view of the model’s authors, the savings constraint was more likely to be the 
binding constraint in the early stages of the development process (Chenery and Strout 1966). 
Under these circumstances, development assistance could be expected to increase investment 
directly by allowing investment to exceed domestic savings levels. As development 
progressed, however, the domestic savings rate could be expected to increase, leading to a 
narrowing and eventual elimination of the savings-investment gap. However, the higher 
demand for foreign-produced intermediate and capital goods generated by the higher 
investment rates could exceed that which could be funded from export earnings. The foreign 
exchange constraint would thus become the binding constraint on investment (and growth). 
In this case, the easing of that constraint, through aid, could actually increase measured 
domestic savings by allowing desired savings levels to be realized ex post.4 A straightforward 
interpretation of this model would suggest that aid should either have no effect on domestic 
savings or cause domestic savings to increase.5 
However, from early on, the general presumption that aid encouraged or facilitated 
growth has been challenged from both the left and the right. From the left, Andre Gunder 
Frank (1963) argued that aid was a net deterrent to development. Its net effect was to draw 
capital out of the receiving country and to direct investment into areas that did not enhance 
the country’s long-term growth but, instead, perpetuated the status of underdevelopment 
(Frank 1963). In effect, aid was merely a tool for sustaining underdevelopment. In this context, 
aid could be expected to result in a net reduction in domestic savings, as net outflows exceed 
inflows, and a fall in the long-term trajectory of growth.6  
From the right, Milton Friedman (1958) argued that the inflow of cheap capital into 
developing countries would, in most cases, simply result in the substitution of foreign 
resources for domestic resources. Aid inflows, in effect, would lead to a commensurate 
reduction in domestic savings. Even in those countries that were able and willing to use 
foreign resources appropriately, aid was not the appropriate conduit for assistance. In the first 
place, these countries could obtain capital from other sources and, secondly, the low price of 
capital implied by aid would produce the wrong incentives, leading to monument building 
and waste. At an empirical level, aid could be expected to be mostly consumed (meaning a fall 
in domestic savings rates) and what aid was not consumed would not contribute to long-term 
growth due to low productivity effects. 
Beyond these works, there have been many further contributions to the theoretical 
debate on aid and savings. These contributions (along with those already discussed) largely 
viewed aid from diametrically-different perspectives. At one end of the spectrum, aid was seen 
as purely additional to domestic resources, therefore contributing to higher investment rates, 4  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
 
growth and eventual graduation from aid dependency (McKinnon, 1964; Fei and Paauw, 1965). 
At the other end of the spectrum, aid was seen as a substitute for domestic savings, resulting in 
either increased consumption or waste.  In that view, aid did not lead to more rapid growth but 
instead perpetuated underdevelopment (Griffin, 1970; Griffin and Enos, 1970; Bauer 1974). 
However, few of these models or perspectives seemed wholly incompatible with Weisskopf’s 
(1972) presumption that aid would be used partly to increase consumption and partly to 
increase investment. In that respect, the theoretical debate appeared to boil down to an 
argument about proportions rather than absolutes. Was aid mostly invested or mostly 
consumed? Partial consumption would necessarily mean a negative effect on the domestic 
savings rate but not a fall in the investment rate. Only full consumption of aid would mean no 
net investment effect, and only a zero (or positive) savings effect of aid would mean that aid 
was fully invested and not consumed. That way of framing the argument appeared to present 
a neat framework that lent itself readily to empirical verification. However, lost in that 
simplification was the fact that aid could also contribute to outflows of income and capital – 
meaning that part of aid would not be available for either investment or consumption. 
2.2  AID AND SAVINGS – THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
2.2.1  Preliminaries 
As noted earlier, the differing perspectives on the efficacy of aid, as a means for generating 
higher investment rates in developing countries, have been recast as divergent presumptions 
with regard to the degree to which aid displaces domestic savings. Total displacement, which 
is largely what was presumed by both dependency theories and some neoclassical 
perspectives (Friedman, 1963; Frank, 1966; Griffin and Enos, 1970), is generally thought to be 
demonstrated by a coefficient of negative one (or below) for aid in (appropriately-measured) 
national or domestic savings equations. The essential reasoning is that (because aid and 
savings are necessarily equal ex post) national (and domestic savings) will contract by the exact 
amount of aid flows since foreign savings (and consumption) have increased without any 
change in investment.7 The alternative view (proposed by the two-gap model as well as those 
of McKinnon (1964) and Fei and Paauw (1965)), that aid is used to increase investment or to 
remove a binding foreign exchange constraint, is thought to be demonstrated by a coefficient 
(for aid) that is close to zero or positive. (Aid either increases or does not affect savings because 
it increases investment by an amount equal to or greater than the amount of aid). A coefficient 
between zero and negative one is thought to imply that aid is partially invested and partially 
saved with a bias in either direction being seen to support one perspective over another. As 
will be demonstrated in the next section, this view grossly oversimplifies a rather complex 
relationship. The aid coefficient in the domestic savings equation, if it is appropriately 
specified, will tell us something about the consumption-savings decision but very little about 
whether it does or does not contribute to investment. However, this discussion is most 
appropriately prefaced by the synopsis of the empirical literature which follows. 
2.2.2  Global Summaries 
In recent years, two studies examined the rather substantial empirical literature on aid and 
savings with a view to establishing a consensus view on the nature and magnitude of that 
relationship suggested by the balance of the evidence. Hansen and Tarp (2000) used Working Paper  5 
 
 
constructed t-statistics for a number of studies to determine to what degree the balance of the 
evidence (from published empirical work) was supportive of the contention that aid was 
wholly a substitute for domestic savings versus the alternative hypothesis that it was at least 
partly additional to domestic savings (i.e. some aid was invested). Doucouliagos and Paldam 
(2006) attempted to derive mean coefficient estimates (for aid in savings equations) from the 
literature and also subjected the studies to rigorous statistical analyses to determine the 
reliability of published results in general. 
In the review by Hansen and Tarp (2000), the interpretation of the aid coefficient in 
savings equations is based on the disaggregation and differencing of the investment-savings 
identity (in ratios relative to GDP), as indicated in Derivation (1), below.8 More specifically, that 
derivation is used to conclude that, if the aid coefficient in the domestic savings equation  
(an estimate of ∂sd/∂a) is equal to -1, all aid is fully consumed and none is invested.9 If that 
coefficient is between -1 and zero, then at least some aid is invested. If it is zero, then aid is fully 
invested. If aid was used to ease a foreign exchange constraint, that coefficient could be 
positive. It is notable that this conclusion is predicated on the assumption that aid has no  
effect on private and other external capital flows (i.e. the differentials for fp and fo, with respect 
to aid, are equal to zero). As will be shown later, these assumptions are not as benign as 
typically assumed.  
Hansen and Tarp (2000) were able to derive the test statistic for the null hypothesis of -1 
for the aid coefficient (in the reported savings equations) for 39 of the 41 studies examined.  
A coefficient of -1 would imply (they argued) that aid displaces domestic savings on a one-to-
one basis. They found that, for 20 of the 39 studies, the derived z-statistic did not allow 
rejection of the (null) hypothesis of a coefficient of -1. However, 18 of those 39 studies did 
reject that null hypothesis, suggesting, instead, that the coefficient was less negative than -1 
(meaning that at least some aid was invested). One study not only rejected the null but also 
suggested that the coefficient was more negative than -1 (meaning, in that framework, that aid 
actually increased consumption by more than the total amount of aid). Hansen and Tarp (2000) 
thus concluded that the balance of the evidence suggests that some aid is invested and some 
of it is consumed (the aid-savings coefficient lies between 0 and -1). 
Doucouliagos and Paldam (2006) used a similar interpretation of the aid-savings 
coefficient in their review. As Table 1 indicates, if the aid coefficient (in an appropriately-
defined domestic savings equation) is negative but less negative than -1 (i.e. between 0 and -1), 
i sn s f
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it is still seen as contributing to investment (and aid effectiveness) by not completely crowding 
out domestic savings. At exactly -1, the coefficient presumed to indicates that aid completely 
crowds out domestic savings and adds nothing to investment activity, and below that value it 
undermines investment, and is harmful to the economy. If the coefficient is positive, it means 
that investment increases by more than the amount of aid. In this case, aid does not simply 
contribute to investment it has a catalytic effect by inducing a higher level of domestic savings 
than would have been the case without aid. This would be the case, for example, if aid relieved 
a foreign exchange constraint that had previously discouraged savings because of limited access 
to capital imports. This is, in fact, part of the argument made by Chenery and Strout (1966). 
TABLE 1:  
Interpretation of the Aid-Savings Relationship 
Equation Specification:   sd = α + μh + γx + ε 
Investment Effect  Super  Full  Some  None  Harmful 
Relevant Coefficient Size  μ > 0  μ ≈ 0  0> μ > -1  μ ≈ 0  μ < -1 
Note:  sd  is the domestic savings/GDP ratio    h  is the aid/GDP ratio 
   μ  is the aid coefficient      x  is a matrix of control variables 
   γ  is a vector of other coefficients    ε  is the error term   
Source:  Doucouliagos and Paldam (2006). 
 
Using 23 preferred coefficient observations from 16 studies, they found an unweighted 
average value of -0.9 for the aid coefficient with a median of -0.79, and a weighted average 
(weighted by sample size) of -0.85.10 If we accept the presumption that a coefficient of -1 
implies full consumption of aid, these estimates clearly suggest that, on average, the larger 
proportion of aid is consumed, though a small portion of aid is, indeed, invested. This finding is 
roughly in line with that of Hansen and Tarp (2000). 
2.2.3  Empirical Results for Africa 
The majority of the studies summarized above attempted to estimate the aid-savings elasticity 
for large groups of developing countries covering all or most of the world’s developing 
regions. However, a few studies did look at specific regions, including sub-Saharan Africa. 
Doucouliagos and Paldam (2006) noted that, when the sample of countries (used to 
estimate overall aid-savings elasticities) included Sub-Saharan African countries, the resulting 
coefficient was generally larger (less negative).11 The unweighted average, median and 
weighted average coefficient estimates (for country samples that included Sub-Saharan 
African countries) were -0.40, -0.51 and -0.42 respectively – significantly lower than the 
comparative estimates when there was no restriction on regional representation in the 
samples (-0.66, -0.72 and -0.64). By comparison, when the samples were restricted to those 
inclusive of Asian countries, the average coefficient estimates were more negative and  
close to the average for the unrestricted set (of samples). When the samples included Latin 
American countries the coefficient estimates were substantially more negative than the 
average for the unrestricted set. 
In conformity with the Doucouliagos and Paldam (2006) results, those studies that strictly 
limited their samples to Sub-Saharan African countries found elasticities between aid and Working Paper  7 
 
 
savings that were generally negative, but smaller than the averages and median suggested by 
the larger literature (using multi-regional country samples). Lensink (1993), using a sample of 
21 Sub-Saharan African countries for the period 1980-88 found statistically-significant aid-
saving elasticities of -0.50 and -0.52 (using OLS and 3SLS respectively). Hadjimichael et al 
(1995), using a sample of 39 countries and covering the period 1987-92, reported coefficient 
estimates of -0.35 and -0.33. Gyimah-Brempong (1992) disaggregated aid into its loans, grants 
and food aid components to determine the savings elasticities of these types of aid separately. 
Using a sample of 34 countries, covering the period 1968-87, Gyimah-Brempong (1992) found 
that grant aid had a strongly negative and significant coefficient (of -1.13) in the savings 
equation, loans had a positive and significant coefficient (0.42) and food aid had a small, 
positive, but insignificant coefficient (0.03). 
These results present us with something of a conundrum. The small absolute size of the 
coefficient for Africa seems to suggest that a rather large proportion of aid is invested in Sub-
Saharan Africa than most other regions (including Asia). Yet, this region has had the lowest 
investment rate and the highest ratio of aid relative to output among the various regions.  
If Africa is receiving more aid and investing most of it, why is its investment rate so low?  
The first step toward answering this question will be to determine whether the presumption 
that a small coefficient (in absolute value) does in fact imply that less aid in consumed  
(and thus more is invested).  
2.3  FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS: SOME BASIC AID ACCOUNTING 
Besides what it says directly about the savings-aid relationship, the typical interpretation of the 
aid coefficient in savings equation has two aspects. First, it is thought to say something about 
the proportion of aid consumed - the effect of aid on domestic savings is opposite to its effect 
on consumption, since that part of aid which displaces savings makes those (displaced) 
resources available for consumption. Second, it is thought to tell us something about the 
investment effect of aid - aid adds to investment as long as its savings effect is positive or less 
negative than then minus one. However, a closer examination will demonstrate that the first 
presumption is exactly correct (if aid and consumption are measured as ratios relative to 
income) but the second is not correct – a factor that, in a large part, explains the apparent 
contradiction in the results for Africa discussed above. 
From the definition of domestic savings (domestic savings is equal to output (Y) minus 
consumption (C)), we get a straightforward relationship between the domestic savings and 
consumption ratios relative to output (Second line of Derivation 2, below). Thereafter, 
straightforward differentiation of these ratios, with respect to the aid to output ratio (a), leads 
to the result that the consumption rate effect of aid (∂c/∂a) is simply the inverse of the 
domestic savings rate effect (∂sd/∂a). Thus, any negative effect of aid on the savings rate 
implies, by definition, a positive effect, of equal absolute magnitude, on the rate or 
consumption and vice versa. In effect, the aid coefficient in the domestic savings rate equation 
says as much about the effect of aid on the rate of consumption (as a proportion of income) as 
it does about the savings rate effect.  
Sd ≡ Y − C
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The implied investment effect can be derived from the income identity, as in Derivation 
(3) below. From that identity, output (Y) is equal to the sum of total consumption (C), total 
investment (I) and net exports (NX). Applying the definition of domestic savings, dividing by 
output (to redefine variables as ratios relative to output) and differentiating with respect to the 
aid ratio, we derive the condition that the effect of aid on domestic savings is equal to the sum 
of the investment effect and the trade balance effect (∂NX/∂a). Since this is an identity (and not 
a behavioural relationship), the presumption in the literature described above (∂sd/∂a = ∂i/∂a – 1) 
can only be true if the trade balance effect is exactly equal to minus one. But there is no 
theoretical or practical reason why this needs be the case. In fact, the more likely scenario is 
that only part of aid receipts will be used to increase imports (and thus contributing to trade 
balance deterioration). Some aid receipts are likely to be used to accumulate reserves, service 
debt or for capital flight – meaning the effect of aid on the trade balance ratio can be more 
properly expected to lie somewhere between 0 and minus 1 but is unlikely to be exactly -1. 
 
A more complete understanding of the likely use of aid, other than for consumption and 
investment, can be gained from disaggregation of the balance of payments identity 
(Derivation (4) Below). A typical division of the capital and financial account (ca) and the 
current account (cu), defined relative to output, into their sub-accounts and utilizing the fact 
that the combination of net transfers relative to output (ntf) and the change in foreign 
liabilities relative to output (Δfl) can be divided into the aid-output ratio and the change in 
other (non-concessional) foreign liabilities relative to output (Δofl),12 leads to the result that the 
trade balance effect of an increase in aid (∂nx/∂a) is equal to negative one plus: any additional 
contraction in foreign liabilities induced by aid (-∂Δfl/∂a) - such as principal payments on non-
concessional debt;13 any additional increase in foreign assets induced by aid (∂Δfa/∂a) - such as 
capital flight or reserve accumulation; and any net factor payments to foreigners induced by 
aid (∂nfp/∂a) - such as interest payments on foreign debt. Clearly, all three of these types of 
reverse flows are likely consequences of aid flows and cannot reasonably be assumed to be 
zero individually or collectively. The larger the sizes of these reverse flows the greater the 
deviation of the trade balance effect from -1. 
Y C I NX
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Combining the results of Derivations (2) – (4) leads to the conclusion that aid has  
not two but three potential types of application: the displacement of domestic savings  
(or, equivalently, consumption), investment, and meeting foreign obligation (reverse flows). 
Put differently, aid can be consumed, invested or used for external transactions not related to 
trade in goods and services. This is shown more clearly in Derivation 5 below. Thus, the degree 
of displacement of foreign savings indicated by the aid coefficient in the savings rate equation 
tells us something quite exact about the amount of aid used for consumption but very little 
about the use of aid for either investment or reverse flows. However, if that information is 
combined with the net export effect of aid, we can determine the precise division of aid 
between the three potential types of use. 
cu ca 0
cu ca
ntr nfp nx fl fa
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The above analysis also brings to the fore a missing aspects of previous analyses – the 
diversion of aid to reverse flows. Whenever aid is used to finance reverse flows (debt servicing, 
capital flight or reserve accumulation), it is no longer available for increasing imports and, 
therefore, cannot contribute to either consumption or investment. In effect, the reverse flow 
decision precedes the consumption-investment decision and places a limit on the amount of 
aid that can be made available to the domestic economy. How much aid contributes to reverse 
flows is therefore important for telling us how much of disbursed aid is capable of having some 
direct effect on domestic economic activity – by contributing to the consumption ratio 
(savings rate displacement) or the investment ratio. The greater the amount of aid used for 
reverse flows the smaller is the trade balance deterioration and thus the smaller the sum of the 
consumption and investment effects. Therefore, the relatively small magnitude of the negative 
savings effect of aid for Sub-Saharan Africa may be more reflective of a small trade balance 
effect (and large reverse flows) than of a large investment effect.  As will be shown below, this 
is in fact the case.  
3  METHODOLOGY 
3.1  THE BEHAVIOURAL EQUATIONS 
Specifications for national and domestic savings equations in most recent empirical work have 
typically been informed by some combination of the permanent income and life cycle income 
hypotheses.14 While this combined model offers invaluable insights into savings behaviour in 
both developed and developing countries, it does not provide complete explanations for some 
of the relationships consistently encountered in empirical estimations of the savings equations 
(Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén, 1997). For example, that model combination does not provide a 
satisfactory explanation for the importance of growth in most (macroeconomic) savings 
equations.15 Other models, such as consumption habit (or relative income hypotheses) models 
and subsistence income models, provide additional and useful insights into savings behaviour. 
In the consumption habit models, for example, growth is a more credible regressor in the 
savings equation, because it represents the increased savings induced by the lagged response 
of consumption to income growth. In the same vein, subsistence-income models offer a 
credible rationale for the importance of per capita income in explaining savings rates in 
developing countries (Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén, 1997). Further, neither of these approaches 
is necessarily inconsistent with the basic premise of the permanent-income hypothesis.  
This investigation, therefore, employs a generalized model of savings that nests all of these 
perspectives. In effect, the ratio of savings to income is presumed to be affected by a range of 
variables (or proxies for such variables) that have been well-established in the empirical 
literature and supported by one or more of these empirical models (Table 2). It will be left to 
the data to establish which model presumptions best approximate the country and  





The Determinants of Savings 
Variables  Symbol Relevant Effect  Effect
Log of Per capita income  LPCY 
Increasing income beyond 
subsistence Positive 
Rate of GDP growth  G  Delayed consumption response  Positive 
Deviation of export growth from recent 
past performance
16 NXG 
Increased in perceived transitory 
income Positive 
The Dependency Ratio  DEP 
Changing generational effect on 
savings Negative 
Official development assistance/GDP 
 Concessional  Loans/GDP 
 Grants/GDP 





Increased public sector (and some 




With respect to the net exports ratio equation, the working assumption is that aid has no 
direct effect on the ratio of exports to income.17 Therefore, the net export term in Derivation  
(4 and 5) can be reduced to the derivative with respect to the import ratio. The relationship to 
be estimated then becomes that between the import/GDP ratio and ODA/GDP ratio.  
The behavioural equation for the import ratio is described within a straightforward 
Keynesian framework (augmented by the aid variables). That specification reflects a 
presumption that the rate of imports relative to output is determined by the export ratio,  
per capita income, the ODA/GDP ratios and other capital flows (see below). 
3.2  MODEL ESTIMATION AND DATA ISSUES 
The savings effect of aid was estimated using a (panel) data set covering 29 Sub-Saharan 
African countries over the period 1965 to 2006. The countries and time periods covered are 
listed in the Appendix II. The data sources were the OECD Creditor Reporting System (OECD), 
World Development Indicators (World Bank), International Financial Statistics (International 
Monetary Fund) and the United Nations Common Data Base (UN Statistical Division). Most of 
the Sub-Saharan African countries excluded from the sample were due to insufficient data.  
The one exception was South Africa, which was excluded because several of that country’s 
attributes (such as its level of financial sector development, per capita income, the dominance 
of commercial loans relative to aid even in the 1960s etc.) made it an outlier relative to the 
other countries in the sample at many levels. 
The model estimation approach was largely determined by the nature of the data and the 
questions being asked. In the first instance, the fact that each variable is defined for 29 
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countries over a period of 42 years (for most countries at least) means that the panel data set 
could be categorized as having a large T as well as reasonably large N. In this context, non-
stationarity of the savings variable (as well as other variables) becomes an issue. Secondly, a 
primary focus of this paper is the long-run relationship between aid and savings. Determining 
this relationship requires an estimation procedure that distinguishes between the short and 
long-run determinants of the savings ratio – making an error correction framework the most 
appropriate estimation approach. 
To determine whether non-stationarity was a legitimate concern, a Fisher panel unit root 
test was applied to the savings variable and the potential explanatory variables. As Table A2 
(Appendix I) indicates, the null hypothesis of full panel non-stationarity was rejected for all 
variables in levels.18 However, the relevant null hypothesis is a strong one: that the variable is non-
stationary for all panels (countries). A more detailed examination of the unit root tests at the panel 
level (using the KPSS and DFGLS tests) indicates that some variables are often non-stationary.19 This 
was true of the savings ratio, the dependency ratio, per capita income, the aid variables and the 
export and import ratios.20 However, the rate of output growth, the innovation on export growth, 
and other external flows are mostly stationary according to both tests. This suggest that the 
former group of variables likely define long-run relationships (even when non-stationary, these 
variables may still be fractionally integrated), whereas the latter group of variables is more likely 
affect short term movements of relevant variables (savings and import ratios). 
To accommodate the likely presence of non-stationarity in some panels, the Pooled Mean 
Group approach of Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) was used to estimate long- and short-run 
relationships within an error-correction framework. The advantage of the pooled mean group 
approach is that it is designed specifically for panel data with large N and large T where non-
stationarity is a concern, but it does not necessarily require non-stationarity across all panels 
(as does the panel cointegration approaches). Further, it makes more effective use of the 
available data than the Mean Group approach by employing both pooling and averaging 
approaches. A long-run equation is estimated by pooling the data for all countries, while 
individual short-run equations are estimated for each country and averaged to determine the 
short-run coefficients for the region. Another advantage of the Pooled Mean Group approach 
is that it is less sensitive to extreme coefficient values at the panel level (Pesaran, Shin and 
Smith, 1999).  The estimation results do indicate that pooling does lead to more definitive 
results for the long-run equation. 
The specifications for the long- and short-run savings rate equations are largely 
determined by the typical level of integration of the variables (at the panel level). The 
variables that are often non-stationary are assumed to be part of the long-run equations 
while the other variables enter the short-run relationships. The specification therefore 
reflects the presumption that, for these mostly low-income African Countries, over the long 
run, the savings rate moves together with (the log of) per capita income (LPCY), the 
dependency ratio (DEP), and total official development assistance relative to output (ODAY) 
or concessional loans relative to output (LO/Y) and grants relative to output (GR/Y) entered 




The remaining (mostly stationary) variables are presumed to be involved in the short-run 
behaviour of the savings rate (together with the first difference of the variables that enter the 
long-run equation). However, in that equation, the growth rate (g) is substituted for the 
change in the level of per capita income because, besides the fact that it proxies that variable, 
it is more directly related to the delayed consumption response suggested by the 
consumption habit models.22 Besides the differenced variables, the remaining variables in the 
short-run equation are the error-correction term (θ), the deviation of export growth from the 
previous three-year average (NXG) – a proxy for transitory income, and other flows from 
abroad (OFL/Y). 
As noted earlier, the estimated equation for the import ratio uses a Keynesian framework 
which  presumes that, over the long-run, the level of imports relative to output (M/Y)) is 
determined by the export ratio (X/Y), the log of per capita income (LPCY) and the ODA/GDP 
ratio (or the loan and grant to GDP ratios separately). A priori, there would be good reason to 
believe that other capital flows help to determine the rate of imports over the long run. 
However, as Table A2 indicates, this variable is quite strictly stationary (unlike the import, 
export or aid ratios). Therefore, it is more reasonable to suppose that other flows influence the 
short- run behaviour of the import ratio – the deviation from long-run equilibrium levels. Given 
the small size and inconsistency of private flows (which make up the bulk of other flows) into 
this region, it does seem more likely that these flows would define short-run, rather than,  
long-run behaviour.23 
The short-run equations are defined by the differenced versions of the long run variables 
with the inclusion of a constant, the error correction term and the other flows (from abroad) 
relative to output (OFL/Y). 
M Y 1 X Y 2 LPCY 3 ODA Y E5
M Y 1 X Y 2 LPCY 3 LO Y 4 GR Y E6
M Y 0 1 X Y 2 Lpcy 3 OFL Y 4 ODA Y E7
M Y 0 1 X Y 2 Lpcy 3 OFL Y 4 LO Y 5 GR Y E8
S d Y 0 1 1 B2g 3NXG 4 DEP 5 OFL Y 6 ODA Y E3
S d Y 0 1 2 2 g 3NXG 4 DEP 5 OFL Y 6 LO Y 7 GR Y E4
Sd Y 1LPCY B2 DEP 3 ODA Y E1
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4  RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
When the pooled mean group procedure is applied to the full sample of countries, the  
long-run equation for the savings rate indicates a coefficient of -0.41 for the ODA/GDP ratio 
(Table A3). The estimated coefficient for the grant/GDP ratio was more negative at -0.52, while 
that for the loan/GDP ratio was negative but insignificant at 0.01. The other included variables 
in the long-run equation (per capita income and the dependency ratio) were also significant in 
at least one version of the estimated equations. 
The strong t-statistic for the grants coefficient, combined with the statistical 
insignificance of the coefficient for loans, would seem to suggest that grants are by far the 
more important form of aid – at least in terms of the long-run relationship with savings. This 
is not altogether surprising given that loans constitute only a small proportion of ODA for 
most of these countries (Figure 2). However, it does appear that, at the very least, loans do 
not have as negative an impact on savings as do grants. Presumably, that fact that loans 
(though concessional) need to be repaid makes it less likely these flows will be directed 
toward consumption. 
The error-correction term, in both versions of the short-run equation, suggests a modest 
speed of error correction (around one third of the deviation from the long-term relationship is 
corrected in the first year). The strongest determinants of short-term movements in the savings 
rate were the rate of growth in output and the innovation in export growth (measured as 
deviation from the average of the previous three years). These terms reflect aspects of 
presumptions of the consumption habits models (delayed response of consumption) and the 
permanent income hypothesis (high savings rate for transitory income) that have generally 
been supported in the literature. Surprisingly, however, other flows (from abroad) could not be 
shown to have any effect on the savings rate. It would seem to suggest that these flows are not 
sufficiently important to make a measurable impression on consumption choices.24 
For the full sample period, the results from the Pooled Mean Group estimation of the 
long- and short-run equations for the import ratio are presented in Table A4. The results for the 
long-run equation suggest that a one-percentage-point rise in the ODA/GDP ratio is associated 
with a 0.65 percentage-point rise in the import/GDP ratio over the long run. This means that 35 
percent of the increase in the ODA ratio is not used to finance imports (of consumption or 
investment goods). As Derivation (4) indicates, that part of an increase in ODA not used to 
finance imports goes toward financing reverse flows - some combination of increases in 
reserves, capital flight or debt service payments.25 The precise nature of this ‘leakage’ cannot 
be determined without significantly more detailed data (which is not available before 1970) 
but, given the high level of indebtedness of most of these countries for much of the period in 
question, it is a fair bet that debt service payments (particularly interest payments) were a 
major part of that ‘leakage’ of ODA flows. It is also worth observing that other flows were again 
not important statistically. 
Given the above estimates of the ODA effect on savings and import ratios, we can also 
estimate the implied investment effect and thus the division of aid between consumption, 
investment and reverse flows in the region as a whole. Given that the coefficient for the 
ODA/GDP ratio in the savings equation (-0.41) is the exact opposite of the consumption rate 
effect (0.41) and the reverse flow is 0.35 (one minus the net import effect of 0.65), we can 
conclude, from the relationship defined in Derivation (5) above, that the investment rate effect Working Paper  15 
 
 
of a change in the ODA ratio is 0.24 (or 1 - 0.35 - 0.41). In effect, for the region as a whole, only 
24% of an increase in the ODA/GDP ratio would typically add to the rate of investment. Of the 
remainder, 35% would contribute to reverse capital flows and 41% would be consumed 
(meaning a displacement of savings). 
As noted earlier, one of the concerns of recent years has been whether the recent increase 
in ODA/GDP ratios across developing countries in general, and Sub-Saharan African countries 
in particular, will induce stronger negative effects on savings, thus indirectly compromising 
domestic resource mobilization efforts. One way of determining whether this concern has 
strong empirical justification is to examine the region’s response during previous periods 
when ODA/GDP ratios were increasing. As Figure 2 indicates, during the 21-year period from 
1974 to 1994, the region experienced a nearly continuous increase in ODA/GDP ratios. If there 
is indeed an inherent tendency to save less when aid levels are increasing, we would expect to 
observe regional savings rate effects somewhat above the long-run estimate for the full 
sample period (1964-2006). As Table A5 indicates, when the saving rate equation is re-
estimated for the period of increasing ODA/GDP ratios, the long-run coefficient estimates for 
the ODA/GDP ratio is less negative than that for the full sample (-0.21 compared to -0.41) and 
the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients is rejected by the Wald test (Table A5). The 
coefficient for the Grant/GDP ratio is similar to the estimate for the full sample period (-0.55 
compared to -0.52) and the Wald test does not reject the null hypothesis of identical effects. 
However, for this period, the coefficient for the Loan/GDP ratio is positive, large, and significant 
(0.40). The implication would seem to be that the effect of the total ODA/GDP ratio on the 
savings rate was smaller during that period because loans were a larger proportion of total 
ODA (see Figure 2) and they had, by and large, a positive impact on the savings rate. Thus, the 
contention that increasing ODA/GDP ratios will encourage weaker domestic savings 
mobilization efforts is not supported by the experience of that period. 
The import equation was also estimated for that increasing-aid period (Table A6). The 
long-run coefficient for ODA in the import equation was found to be 0.52, meaning that 48% of 
aid was used to finance reverse flows during that period. When this information is combined 
with the aid-savings effect, what it says about the broad allocation of aid is only moderately 
encouraging. Using the Derivation 2 and 5 above, we can determine that 21% of aid was used 
to increase the rate of consumption (reduce the rate of saving), 31% was used to increase the 
investment ratio and 48% was used for reverse flows. Thus, during that period, slightly more 
aid went to increase investment and there was less displacement of savings (consumption). 
However, only slightly more than half of aid ever made its way into the domestic economy. 
Close to half of aid receipts were used to meet foreign obligations rather than boost domestic 
economic activity. 
The other issue of concern investigated here was whether the speed of recovery of the 
savings rate after a period of high aid levels (defined here as ODA/GDP ratios of 10% or higher) 
was sufficiently rapid to assuage concerns of an aid hangover for these countries – the 
situation where consumption patterns during periods of high aid inflows (relative to output) 
become so institutionalized that they change only slowly (despite the fact that the inflows that 
accommodated high consumption rates are no longer available), thus leading to the further 
deterioration in savings rates when previously high aid inflows drop. 
To determine whether this was a likely scenario, dummy variables for the first year and the 
first three years after periods of high aid flows were added to the short-run equations for the 16  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
 
Pooled Mean Group analysis. (For the purposes of this exercise, periods of high aid flows were 
defined as periods of five years of more when the ODA/GDP ratio was persistently above 
10%).26 An aid hangover would be indicated by a significant and negative coefficient for the 
dummy variables in the years immediately after the high-aid periods - because attempts to 
sustain high consumption ratios would lead to savings rates below that which would be 
predicted by the general equation (which covers both high and low aid periods). As Table A7 
indicates, none of the dummy coefficients are significant. It appears that, for the region in 
general, savings rates adjust immediately to changes in the level of aid inflows. There is no 
evidence of aid hangovers from the past experience of the region. 
Since the Pooled Mean Group approach uses the pooled data to estimate the long-run 
equation, but estimates and then averages individual country estimates of the short-run 
equation, it is possible to examine the estimated coefficients for the dummy variables for each 
country. Fifteen of the 29 countries had episodes of high aid ratios followed by a decline. 
Among these countries the coefficient for the dummy variable for the first year of decline was 
insignificant (at the 10% level or better) for 10 countries and significant for five. Of the five 
countries for which the coefficient was significant, it was negative and significant for one 
(Central African Republic and Mali) and positive and significant for the remaining four (The 
Gambia, Ghana, Malawi and Mauritania). When the response was examined over a three-year 
period, only two countries indicated a significant response: Chad, with a positive response and 
Burundi with a negative response. Thus, only two countries suggest evidence of aid hangovers 
while five suggest overcompensation – savings levels have risen more sharply when aid levels 
declined (from very high levels) than would be predicted by the model. In effect, aid hangovers 
have been neither common nor singular responses to declines in aid levels. 
5  CONCLUSION 
The relatively rapid rise in ODA flows to Sub-Saharan Africa, in the years following the 
Enhanced HIPC Initiatives of 1999 and the establishment of the Millennium Development 
Goals of 2000 (United Nations, 2000), have raised concerns about the effect of these flows on 
savings in a region that already has a poor savings record. The concerns have been that: 
•  Rather then being purely additional, aid will displace domestic savings and, thus, 
reduce domestic resource mobilization efforts; 
•  That effect will be exacerbated in this period of consistently increasing aid flows; 
•  Countries may suffer an aid hangover when aid levels decline because the 
consumption patterns accommodated by high aid levels may become 
institutionalized, making it difficult for countries to adjust consumption patterns 
when aid flows decline. In this case, savings rates would actually fall when aid 
levels decline, as recipient countries attempt to maintain consumption levels at 
the cost of domestic savings. 
 
These issues were examined individually in this paper. However, this was preceded by an 
examination and clarification of the interpretation of the coefficient for the aid (ODA) ratio in the 
savings rate equation. The convention in the literature has been the interpretation that a 
coefficient of -1 is an indication of full consumption of aid, and full displacement of domestic Working Paper  17 
 
 
savings, while a coefficient of zero (or a positive number) implied full investment of aid and, thus, 
no displacement of domestic savings. However, this convention implicitly assumes that all aid is 
used to expand the trade deficit (increase imports) – an unlikely scenario. The need to increase 
foreign reserves, debt service payments and capital flight all place demands on the foreign 
resources that aid brings. Thus, how much of aid is invested or consumed can only be determined 
after its effect on the trade deficit is determined. Without that additional information, any particular 
coefficient provides very incomplete information about the actual use of aid. 
The empirical analysis, using the Pooled Mean Group analysis for a sample of 29 Sub-
Saharan African countries, indicates that, for the region and covering the period 1965-2006, on 
average, 35% of each percentage point of aid relative to GDP was used to finance reverse 
capital flows, 41% was consumed (thus displacing domestic savings) and 24% was used to 
increase investment. Thus, the dominant use of aid is not investment but consumption and the 
financing of reverse flows. More then one third of aid typically did not make it into the 
domestic economy. Thus, what looks like a relatively small negative savings effect for Africa 
compared to other regions (-0.41) does not imply, as is often thought, that a large proportion 
of aid is invested. Instead, only one quarter of aid (24%) was invested for that region over  
the sample period (1965-2006). The remainder was used to finance reverse flows not  
directly related to consumption or investment (i.e. dept service payments, capital flight  
and reserve accumulation). 
When aid is disaggregated into grants and loans the former, as expected, showed the 
most negative impact on domestic savings. The long-run coefficient for grants in the savings 
equation was more negative than the coefficient for ODA. The coefficient for loans was also 
negative but small and insignificant. Clearly, with respect to savings, the effect of grants and 
concessional loans do not appear to be identical. 
An examination of a previous period of consistently rising aid flows (1974-94) suggests 
significantly weaker displacement of domestic savings than was the case for the full sample 
period (1964-2006). This was due largely to a stronger impact of the loans which entered the 
equation with a positive and significant coefficient – nullifying a large part of the larger 
negative effect of grants. In fact, for each percentage point increase in the aid-income ratio, for 
that period, the domestic savings rate decreased by 0.21%. At the same time, the trade balance 
deteriorated, on average, by 0.52% for ever one percentage point increase in the aid ratio. 
These numbers imply that, for that period, 48% of aid was used to finance reverse flows, 21% 
for consumption and 31% for investment. From an investment perspective, this is a slightly 
better performance than that for the whole sample period, but it also suggests that less aid 
made it into the domestic economy. 
A test of the hypothesis that savings rates were lower than anticipated in the years when 
previously high aid levels dropped – indicative of an aid hangover – gives no support to that 
hypothesis. The coefficient for dummy variables for the first and first three years after a high 
aid period was not significant. In fact, for the 15 countries that experienced high-aid periods 
only seven demonstrated a substantive response of the savings rate to a fall in aid-to-output 
ratio. Further, only two of these indicated a negative response, and the relevant coefficients 
were only weakly significant. It appears that an aid hangover is an atypical phenomenon for 
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Figure 2:  Average ODA Rates























































































































































































































































Stationarity Tests for Relevant Variables 
Variables 
Fisher (Full Panel) Test  Individual Tests by Panel (Country) 












***  7 3 
Dependency Ratio  129.70
*** 719.02
***  1 0 
Ln. Per Capita Income  84.82
** 94.562
***  3 3 
GDP Growth  834.26  2282.17
***  26 20 
Innovation in Export Growth  522.98
***  912.62
***  28 19 
ODA/GDP 137.81
***  1479.01
***  12 2 
Concessional Loans/GDP  176.19
***  1349.34
***  4 0 
Grants/GDP 112.61
***  1115.16
***  16 4 
Other Flows/GDP  534.65
***  1988.66
***  19 12 
Exports/GDP 201.39
*** 585.19
*** 9  2 
Imports/GDP 187.38
*** 452.93
*** 11  5 
Notes:    ***   Indicates significance at the 1% level;  
**  Indicates significance at the 5% level;   





Pooled Mean Group Estimates of the Savings Equation (1965-2006) 
Dependent Variable:  The Domestic Savings Rate 
Explanatory Variables  Long-Run Coefficients 











ODA/ GDP  -0.411
*** 
(-7.74)   
Concessional Loans/ GDP 







































∆ ODA/ GDP  0.019 
(0.33)   
∆ Concessional Loans/ GDP 
  -0.123 
(-0.80) 
∆ Grants/GDP 
  0.100 
(1.36) 
Number of Observations  1173  1168 
Notes:  ***   Indicates significance at the 1% level;  
**   Indicates significance at the 5% level;  
*  Indicates significance at the 10% level. 




Import Equation (1965-2006) 
Dependent Variable:  Imports/GDP 




Log of Per Capita Income  0.010
* 
(1.90) 
ODA/ GDP  0.653
* 
(14.71 




Error Correction Term  -0.319
*** 
(-8.25) 
∆ Exports/GDP  0.227
*** 
(3.22) 
∆ Log of Per Capita Income  -0.019
* 
(-1.33) 
Other Flows/ GDP  0.156 
(1.32) 
∆ ODA/ GDP  0.095 
(1.21) 
Number of Observations  1185 
Notes:   ***   Indicates significance at the 1% level; 
**   Indicates significance at the 5% level;   
*  Indicates significance at the 10% level. 





Pooled Mean Group Estimates of the Savings Equation (1974-1994) 
Dependent Variable:  The Domestic Savings Rate 
Explanatory Variables  Long-Run Coefficients 











ODA/ GDP  -0.206
** 
(-2.32)   
Concessional Loans/ GDP    0.403
*** 
(2.69) 
Grants/ GDP    -0.554
*** 
(-4.98) 































∆ ODA/ GDP  -0.062 
(-0.64)   
∆ Concessional Loans/ GDP    -0.366
** 
(-2.55) 
∆ Grants/GDP    0.318 
(1.02) 
   Number of Observations  609 609 
Test for Equality of ODA/GDP Coefficients (χ
2) 
(Sub-sample versus full sample) 
5.35
**   
Test for Equality of Loan/GDP Coefficients (χ
2) 
(Sub-sample versus full sample) 
 7.63
*** 
Test for Equality of Grant/GDP Coefficients (χ
2) 
(Sub-sample versus full sample) 
 0.13 
Notes:  ***   Indicates significance at the 1% level; 
   * *  Indicates significance at the 5% level 
    *  Indicates significance at the 10% level. 




Import Equation (1974-1994) 
Dependent Variable:  Imports/GDP 




Log of Per Capita Income  -0.016
** 
(-1.96) 
ODA/ GDP  0.523
*** 
(7.43) 
  Short-Run Coefficients 
Constant  0.020 
(0.85) 
Error Correction Term  -0.451
*** 
(-9.03) 
∆ Exports/GDP  -0.006 
(-0.08) 
∆ Log of Per Capita Income  -0.011 
(-0.50) 
Other External Flows/GDP  0.252 
(1.59) 
∆ ODA/ GDP  0.178
* 
(1.66) 
Number of Observations  607 
Notes:  ***   Indicates significance at the 1% level; 
   * *  Indicates significance at the 5% level 
    *  Indicates significance at the 10% level. 
Figures in brackets are z-statistics. 





Pooled Mean Group Estimates of the Savings Equation with Dummies 
Dependent Variable:  The Domestic Savings Rate 
Explanatory Variables  Long-Run Coefficients 




























(-8.66)    
Concessional Loans/ GDP 











































































∆ ODA/ GDP  -0.026 
(0.46) 
0.024 
(0.44)    
∆ Concessional Loans/ GDP 









The first year after a high ODA/GDP 
Period (Dummy) 
0.010 
(0.74)    0.008 
(0.63)   
The first three years after a high 
ODA/GDP Ratio (Dummy)    0.004 
(0.59)    0.003 
(0.56) 
Number of Observations  1173 1173 1168  1168 
Notes:  ***   Indicates significance at the 1% level; 
   * *  Indicates significance at the 5% level 
    *  Indicates significance at the 10% level. 




Sub-Saharan African Countries in Sample 
Country Years  covered 
Benin 1965-2005 
Botswana 1965-2006 
Burkina Faso  1965-2004 
Burundi 1965-2005 
Cameroon 1965-2006 
Central African Rep.  1965-2004 
Chad 1965-2006 
Congo, Rep.  1965-2006 
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1. However, this region has not usually been the highest recipient of aid in per capita terms. That particular honour has 
mostly gone to the Middle East and North Africa. 
2. At least beyond the levels of the 1990s. 
3. Strictly speaking, an external resource flow imparts immediate command over foreign (rather than domestic) 
resources, but that command can be exchanged for command over domestic resources through the sale of foreign 
currency (or other foreign assets). 
4. In the absence of such flows, ex post domestic savings and investment would be lower – constrained by limited access 
to foreign exchange for the purchase of capital and intermediate inputs. 
5. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the model would allow for less than full investment of aid as long as a substantial 
proportion of aid still goes to investment. 
6. It should be noted, however, that the causal chain suggested by Frank (1963) would imply a lag between the timing of 
aid inflows and capital outflows. Thus, the net effect on savings need not show up in contemporaneous measurements. 
7. Friedman’s (1964) argument that aid, if invested at all, would most likely be used for monument building, and Gunder 
Frank’s (1963) perspective that aid would perpetuate dependency; both allow for a coefficient larger than negative one 
because some aid might be invested. Instead, the effect of this use of aid would be demonstrated by the absence of any 
long-term growth effect. However, this shifts us more directly into the aid-growth debate, which is beyond the scope of 
this research. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that neither perspective presumes strict consumption of aid, 
though there is clear presumption that it is the most likely response. 
8. As in all equations to follow, lower case letters imply values relative to GDP. 
9. In this set of equations, i is the investment rate, sn is the national savings rate, sf is the foreign savings rate, sd is the 
domestic savings rate, ntr represents net transfers from abroad, a is aid relative to output (grants plus concessional 
loans), fp is net private (nonconcessional) flows relative to output, and fo is other foreign flows relative to output. 
10. There were actually 61 observations overall, and they also looked at eight earlier studies that used proxies for aid in 
attempting to do the same (adding another 28 observations) but these are not considered here. 
11. These are samples that were inclusive of Sub-Saharan African countries, but not necessarily exclusive to them. Thus, 
most of these country samples would have included countries from other regions as well. 
12. Private transfers are assumed to be zero for convenience. Including private transfers would add an extra term without 
changing the result. 
13. Non-aid debt is specified because principal payments on concessional debt are netted out of aid measures. 
14. In fact, the term “life cycle permanent income hypothesis” is often used to refer to an amalgam of the two theories 
because both theories derive from the premise of a strong link between lifetime income and consumption. 
15. The permanent income hypothesis predicts the wrong sign for growth and the reasoning provided by the life cycle 
theory (generational differences in income) is not borne out by the microeconomic evidence (Bosworth et al, 1991). 
16. Estimated as the difference between current export growth and the average growth rate of the previous three years. 
17. This is a very reasonable assumption for these low-income countries that mostly export primary products. Aid, in and 
of itself, is unlikely to have any significant direct effect on either increased factor use or productivity in the export sector. 
18. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller version of this test is reported but the results based on the Phillip-Perron  tests are similar. 
19. The evidence suggests that variables such as the grants to GDP ratio and the import to GDP ratio may be largely 
fractionally integrated (i.e. long memory series that are not quite non-stationary). 
20. The Phillip-Perron test suggests that the level of integration of the dependency ratio is I(2) or higher, but this is not 
supported by any other tests (including the KPSS and DFGLS tests). This is likely due to the fact that this variable was 
subject to sudden, post-census adjustments by some countries. 
21. An argument can be made, on theoretical grounds, that other flows (OFL/Y) belong in the long run equation as well. 
However, the stationarity tests do suggest that that variable is mostly stationary and, in the context of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, where non-aid flows have not been an either large or consistent part of external flows, that argument is weaker. 
Moreover, that variable performed best in the short-run equation. (It was insignificant in the long-run equation) 
22. It was also much more strongly supported statistically, even when entered in lagged form. 
23. Besides private flows, the “other flows” variable includes non-aid loans, private grants, emergency aid, food aid, and 
technical assistance. 
24. Including them in the long-run equation did not make a difference either. 
25. But not including principal payments on aid-related debt because these are netted out of aid figures. 
26. Since 10% is a relatively arbitrary rate, to determine the sensitivity of the result to the definition of “high” aid ratio, 
12% and 8% were also used. There was very little difference in results between 10% and 12% but the results for 8% were 
significantly weaker. This suggest that there is something of a threshold effect at around 10% and it is thus a good choice 
for defining the cut of level for “high” aid flows. International
Centre for Inclusive Growth
International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC - IG)
Poverty Practice, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP
Esplanada dos Ministérios, Bloco O, 7º andar
70052-900    Brasilia, DF -  Brazil
Telephone:   +55 61 2105 5000
E-mail: ipc@ipc-undp.org    URL: www.ipc-undp.org